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FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCH AND
SEIZURE OF PROPERTY ABROAD:
EROSION OF THE RIGHTS OF
ALIENS
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,' the United States Supreme
Court held that the fourth amendment2 does not protect individuals
against the search and seizure by a United States agent of property
that is both owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign
country. This Note explores the Verdugo-Urquidez opinions and con-
cludes that the Court wrongly refused to recognize the application
of the fourth amendment to the above factual situation. This Note
reasons that the Court misconstrued both the history and the text of
the fourth amendment. This Note also reasons that, in misapplying
precedent, the Court improperly lent credence to notions of terri-
toriality and social compact long since rejected by the Court. This
Note further reasons that the Court committed an egregious error
in ignoring notions of fairness and mutuality implicit in the fourth
amendment. Finally, this Note concludes that, in reaching its deci-
sion, the Court may have been subtly influenced by political pres-
sures created by a highly publicized murder intimately connected to
the case.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Respondent Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez is a citizen and
resident of Mexico.3 He is also a registered United States alien. 4
1 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
2 The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States proclaims that,
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
3 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059.
4 Brief for Respondent at 5 n.3, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056
(1990) (No. 88-1353) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
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The United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) be-
lieves that Verdugo-Urquidez is one of the leaders of a large and
violent narcotics smuggling ring:5 In addition, he was a suspect in
the highly publicized murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena
Salazar.6 In fact, Verdugo-Urquidez subsequently was convicted for
this murder in a separate proceeding.
7
On August 3, 1985, the United States obtained a warrant for
Verdugo-Urquidez's arrest in connection with this smuggling ring.
8
On January 24 of the following year, while driving his car in San
Felipe, Baja California, Mexico, six Mexican police officers stopped
Verdugo-Urquidez. 9 The officers ordered Verdugo-Urquidez from
his car, placed him in their police vehicle, and drove him to the Mex-
ican/American border. 10 Verdugo-Urquidez was then transported
across the border to Calexico, California, where United States Mar-
shalls arrested him."
Following Verdugo-Urquidez's arrest, a DEA agent began mak-
ing arrangements to search Verdugo-Urquidez's two Mexican resi-
dences located in Mexicali and San Felipe. 12 DEA officials believed
that these searches would reveal evidence related to Verdugo-Ur-
quidez's alleged smuggling activities and his involvement in the
murder of Camarena Salazar. At the agent's request, the Assistant
Special Agent in charge of the DEA office in Mexico City contacted
the Director General of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP),
who authorized the searches and promised the cooperation of Mexi-
can authorities.' 3 The DEA never sought approval from either the
Justice Department or any United States Attorney's Office for the
intended search in Mexico. 14 The DEA also never discussed ob-
taining a search warrant from an American magistrate.' 5 DEA
5 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059.
6 Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 144-149.
7 Verdugo-Urquidez was sentenced to 240 years in prison and an additional life
term for his role in what the prosecution termed "narco-terrorism." L.A. Times, Oct.
27, 1988, at A3, col. 5.
8 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059.
9 District Court's factual findings as noted in Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at
3-4.
10 Id. at 4.
11 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 8-9.
15 Id. at 9. As Justice Brennan pointed out, "a warrant serves the same primary func-
tion overseas as it does domestically; it assures that a neutral magistrate has authorized
the search and limited its scope." Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1077 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). In failing to obtain a neutral magistrate's approval for the search, the DEA
agents guaranteed themselves the opportunity to conduct a search without boundaries.
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agents, in conjunction with members of the MFJP, searched both
residences and seized certain documents relating to Verdugo-Ur-
quidez's involvement in narcotics trafficking and the assassination of
Camarena Salazar. 16 In particular, the search of the Mexicali resi-
dence uncovered a tally sheet, which the government believed re-
flected quantities of marijuana smuggled into the United States by
Verdugo-Urquidez. 17
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California granted Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to suppress evi-
dence seized during the searches, concluding that the fourth
amendment applied to the searches and that the DEA agents had
failed to justify searching Verdugo-Urquidez's premises without a
warrant.18 The District Court found that Verdugo-Urquidez, a reg-
istered alien, was among "the people" protected by the fourth
amendment.19
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed this decision.20 In support of its decision, the Court of Ap-
peals relied on two Supreme Court decisions: Reid v. Covert2 ' and
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza.22 Reid con-
cerned the right of American citizens to be protected by the fifth
and sixth amendments when tried by United States military authori-
ties overseas. The Court held that citizens abroad are entitled to the
protections of the fifth and sixth amendments. 23 Lopez-Mendoza con-
cerned the rights of aliens illegally within the United States to be
protected by the fifth and sixth amendments. In Lopez-Mendoza, the
Court went beyond Reid and held that illegal aliens were also enti-
tled to these constitutional rights. 24 Based on these two decisions,
the Court of Appeals reasoned that it would be odd to acknowledge
Verdugo-Urquidez's entitlement to fifth and sixth amendment pro-
tections, but deny him the protections afforded by the fourth
amendment. 25
16 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059.
17 Brief for Petitioner at 4, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056
(1990) (No. 88-1353) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
18 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059.
19 Id.
20 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988).
21 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
22 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
23 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)).
24 Verdugo-Urquidkz, 110 S. Ct. at 1059-60 (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032 (1984)).
25 Id. at 1060.
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III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority,26 Chief Justice Rehnquist began by
noting that the fourth amendment functions differently from the
fifth amendment.2 7 The privilege against self-incrimination guaran-
teed by the fifth amendment 28 is a fundamental right of criminal de-
fendants; its violation may occur only at trial.29 By contrast, a
violation of the fourth amendment is "fully accomplished" at the
time of an unreasonable government intrusion.30 Thus, if there was
a constitutional violation in this case, it occurred solely in Mexico; as
such, it was not a domestic matter.31
The Chief Justice also examined the fourth amendment phrase
"the people." 32 Unlike the fifth and sixth amendments which apply
to all criminal defendants regardless of citizenship, the fourth
amendment has been interpreted to apply only to "the people."
The majority interpreted "the people" as a term of art referring to
"a class of persons who are part of a national community or have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
26 Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy.
27 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060.
28 The fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States proclaims that,
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject to the same offence be put twice in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
29 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060. While a violation of the fifth amendment may
occur only at trial, behavior of law enforcement officials prior to trial ultimately may
impair that right. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
30 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
354 (1974)).
31 Id. The majority stated that the locus of the search is of constitutional importance.
The Court apparently believes that government actions that violate the language of the
fourth amendment in foreign jurisdictions cannot be recognized as constitutional viola-
tions in U.S. courts. Thus, the fact that the violation of the language of the fourth
amendment occurred in Mexico means that a victim of United States government action
abroad cannot be restored. However, this is based on the incorrect notion that the Con-
stitution only controls within the borders of the United States. Recall, for example, Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The point lost on the majority is that the fourth amend-
ment restricts United States officials wherever a search takes place. For a further discus-
sion of this issue, see infra Section IV.
32 See supra note 2.
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considered part of that community."33 Those who have not estab-
lished a sufficient connection to this country are not one of "the
people," and thus are not entitled to fourth amendment
protections.
The majority claimed that the legislative history of the fourth
amendment also suggests that the purpose of the amendment was to
restrict only those searches and seizures conducted by agents of the
United States within the borders of the United States. 4
It was never suggested that the provision was intended to restrain the
actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United
States territory. There is likewise no indication that the fourth amend-
ment was understood by contemporaries of the Framers to apply to
activities of the United States directed against aliens in foreign
territory.3
5
In light of this interpretation, the Court criticized the "global
view"3 6 taken by the Court of Appeals as contrary to the Supreme
Court's decisions in the Insular Cases.37 These cases held that not
every constitutional provision applies to governmental activity, even
where the United States has sovereign power.38 In addition,Johnson
v. Eisentrager39 rejected the notion that aliens are entitled to fifth
amendment protections outside the sovereign territory of the
United States.40 Thus, the Verdugo-Urquidez Court concluded that
33 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1061. The Court adopted the view that the Consti-
tution is a social compact between the American people and their government,
[a]nd therefore does not restrict the conduct of the American government toward
other people .... Concentrating on the identity of the alleged rightholder to deter-
mine if he can be deemed a party to this compact, this perspective holds constitu-
tional protections inapplicable to aliens affected by the actions of American officials
outside the United States.
Note, The Extraterritorial Applicability of the Fourth Amendment, 102 HItv. L. REv. 1672,
1674 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Extraterritorial Applicability]. This view stands in contrast
to the "organic" or "natural rights" perspective, which "envisions the United States
government as entirely a creature of the Constitution and bound thereby in all its ac-
tions... This view focuses on the identity of the alleged infringer of a right. It therefore
potentially entitles anyone injured by United States officials-American or alien-to
constitutional redress." Id. at 1674-75. While there may be limits to the organic per-
spective, there is nothing in the Constitution to support the notion of social compact.
See generally Section IV infra.
34 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1061.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1062. The "global view" that the Court attacks is synonymous with the "or-
ganic" or "natural rights" perspective. For a discussion of this perspective, see supra
note 33.
37 See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (fifth amendment right to jury
trial inapplicable in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) (sixth
amendment grand jury provision inapplicable in Philippines).
38 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1062.
39 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
40 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1063 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
783
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
the view that every Constitutional provision applied wherever the
United States government exercised its power was insupportable.
4 1
Verdugo-Urquidez also relied on the decision of the Court in
Reid v. Covert to argue that federal officials are constrained by the
fourth amendment wherever and whenever they act. 42 The Court
attacked this line of reasoning, declaring it was misplaced, and sub-
sequently limited the holding in Reid to allow only United States citi-
zens stationed abroad to invoke the protections of the fifth and sixth
amendments. 43  Furthermore, the Court also characterized
Verdugo-Urquidez as misguided for relying on a series of cases
which he argued held that aliens enjoy certain constitutional
rights.44 From the majority's perspective, these cases "establish[ed]
only that aliens receive[d] constitutional protections when they
[had] come within the territory of the United States and developed
substantial connections with this country."' 45 Since Verdugo-Ur-
quidez is an alien "who has had no previous significant voluntary
connection with the United States . . .these cases avail him not."
4 6
The Court also distinguished its holding in Lopez-Mendoza,
where a majority of justices assumed, but did not decide, that the
fourth amendment applies to illegal aliens in the United States.
47
According to the Court, the decision in Lopez-Mendoza "did not en-
compass whether the protections of the fourth amendment extend
(1950)). Recall, however, that at the time of the search of his Mexican residences,
Verdugo-Urquidez was already in the United States and under the control of United
States officials. Therefore, a case regarding Constitutional protections of aliens outside
the United States cannot assist the majority in its argument here.
41 Id. at 1062.
42 Id. at 1063.
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1982) (illegal aliens protected by
equal protection clause); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (resi-
dent aliens entitled to fifth and sixth amendment rights); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 369 (1886) (fourteenth amendment protects resident aliens).
45 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064.
46 Id. The Court omitted the fact that Verdugo is a registered United States alien
and was lawfully within the United States at the time of the search, albeit against his will.
None of these cases requires that an alien's presence be voluntary. Therefore, as Justice
Brennan pointed out in dissent, these cases should indeed apply. Id. at 1070 n.5 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 1064. The Court distinguished Lopez-Mendoza by claiming that it relied on
the assumption that the fourth amendment applies to illegal aliens within this country.
However, this is an inaccurate characterization of the Court's holding. In Lopez-Mendoza,
the Court impliedly recognized that illegal aliens within the United States have fourth
amendment rights. Therefore, Verdugo-Urquidez, as an alien legally within this coun-
try, was entitled to protection under the fourth amendment. Moreover, in Lopez-Men-
doza, even the Solicitor General of the United States conceded that illegal aliens have
fourth amendment rights. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 39-40.
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to illegal aliens in this country." 48 In fact, even if such aliens were
entitled to fourth amendment protections, they were distinguishable
from Verdugo-Urquidez because they were in this country volunta-
rily; Verdugo-Urquidez had no voluntary connection with this coun-
try. Thus, there was no link which might place him among "the
people" of the United States for purposes of the fourth
amendment.4
9
Finally, the majority turned to the possible negative conse-
quences of accepting Verdugo-Urquidez's arguments.50  In
Verdugo-Urquidez's claims, the Court saw "significant and deleteri-
ous consequences for the United States in conducting activities be-
yond its boundaries." 5 1 The Court feared that the rule adopted by
the Court of Appeals would apply not only to law enforcement oper-
ations abroad, but also to other foreign policy operations which
might result in searches or seizures. 52 The Court, in particular,
feared that the Court of Appeals' decision would tread on the au-
thority of the political branches and the abilities of the armed
forces. 53 "If there are to be restrictions on searches and seizures
which occur incident to such American action, they must be im-
posed by the political branches through diplomatic understanding,
treaty, or legislation." 54
Because Verdugo-Urquidez was a citizen and resident of Mex-
ico, with no voluntary attachment to the United States, and because
the place searched was located in Mexico, the Court concluded that
the fourth amendment could not be applied.55
48 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064. But see Amid Curiae Brief of American Civil
Liberties Union, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (No. 88-
1353) [hereinafter ACLU Brief] (arguing that Verdugo-Urquidez was lawfully present in
the United States at the time of the search at issue). Thus, this case does not involve the
rights of nonresident aliens, but rather the constitutional rights of a foreign national
lawfully residing here, and facing prosecution here for violation of United States laws.
This should place Verdugo-Urquidez among "the people" protected by the fourth
amendment. See also supra notes 46-47.
49 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1065.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. The Court's fear, however, is unfounded. As an alien legally within the United
States, Verdugo-Urquidez's claim does not advocate according protections of the fourth
amendment to aliens abroad and without ties to this country. Furthermore, actions re-
lating to national security during wartime generally are accorded greater leeway by the
Court. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
54 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1066.
55 Id.
785
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
B. CONCURRING OPINIONS
Justice Kennedy concurred with the opinion of the Court.56
Justice Kennedy, however, rejected the notion that the reference in
the fourth amendment to "the people" was intended to restrict its
protections. 57 Rather, the crucial consideration in Justice Ken-
nedy's analysis of cases involving the extraterritorial application of
the Constitution, was whether the person claiming its protection is a
citizen or an alien. 58 According to Justice Kennedy, a fine distinc-
tion should be observed when noting whether the person claiming
the protection of the Constitution is a citizen or an alien, as "the
Constitution does not create, nor do general principles of law cre-
ate, any juridical relation between our country and some undefined,
limitless class of noncitizens who are beyond our territory." 59
In light of this distinction, Justice Kennedy suggested that the
question addressed by the Court should be refocused. One alterna-
tive focus is "what constitutional standards apply when the Govern-
ment acts, in reference to an alien, within its sphere of foreign
operations?" 60 Constitutional protections must be interpreted "in
light of the undoubted power of the United States to take actions to
assert its legitimate power and authority abroad. ' 61 Thus, "there
are provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily apply in all
circumstances in every foreign place."
62
In conclusion, Justice Kennedy noted that "the conditions and
considerations of this case would make adherence to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement 63 impracticable and anoma-
lous." 64 "The absence of local judges or magistrates available to
issue warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable concep-
tions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the
need to cooperate with foreign officials all indicate that the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement should not apply in Mexico as it
does in this country."
'65
56 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57 Id. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
58 Id. at 1066 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Here, Justice Kennedy seemed to explicidy
adopt the "social compact" theory. See supra note 33.
59 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1066 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
60 Id. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957)
(Harlan, J., concurring)). For reasons left unexplained, Justice Kennedy tempered his
earlier approval of the social compact perspective. See supra notes 33 and 58.
63 See supra note 2 (providing language of the warrant requirement).
64 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
65 Id. at 1068 (Kenned9, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy focused on what might be
required to issue a warrant in a foreign country. However, the proper question is, as-
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Justice Stevens also concurred in the judgment of the Court,
but declined to join the Court's "sweeping opinion." 66 In his opin-
ion, he noted that "aliens who are lawfully present in the United
States are among those 'people' who are entitled to the protection
of the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment." 67 How-
ever, he concluded that the search was not "unreasonable as that
term is used in the first clause of the [Fourth] Amendment ....
[T]he Warrant Clause has [no] application to searches of non-
citizen's homes in foreign jurisdictions because American magis-
trates have no power to authorize such searches."
68
C. DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Brennan, joined by justice Marshall, authored a dissent-
ing opinion. In his powerful dissent, Justice Brennan recognized
that the nature of the Court's holding was such that "although for-
eign nationals must abide by our laws even when in their own coun-
tries, our Government need not abide by the Fourth Amendment
when it investigates them for violations of our laws."
'69
Quoting the plurality opinion in Reid, Justice Brennan noted
that "the United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its
power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accord-
ance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution. ' 70 Fur-
thermore, as Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence, "the
Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether
the actions in question are foreign or domestic." 71 Thus, in the
opinion of Justice Brennan, the majority created an antilogy: "the
Constitution authorizes our Government to enforce our criminal
suming authority, whether a United States Magistrate would issue the warrant in accord-
ance with the demands of the United States Constitution and our conceptions of privacy
and reasonableness. While the warrant requirement might be disposed of by Justice
Kennedy's conception, it does not discard the fourth amendment's protection against
unreasonable search and seizure.
66 Id (Stevens, J., concurring).
67 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
68 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). However, as Justice Brennan noted in dissent, the
Warrant Clause exists so that a magistrate can make a determination of the reasonable-
ness of the proposed search. It is not necessary for the constitutional purposes dis-
cussed here that the magistrate be empowered to grant the particular warrant. Id. at
1076-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 1069 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1957)). This is one of the strongest expressions of the "organic perspective" by the
Court, and stands in stark contrast to the Court's holding in Verdugo-Urquidez. See supra
note 33 (discussing elements of the organic perspective).
71 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1069 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1067
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
laws abroad, but when Government agents exercise this authority,
the Fourth Amendment does not travel with them. This cannot be.
At the very least, the Fourth Amendment is an unavoidable correla-
tive of the Government's power to enforce the criminal law."'72
Justice Brennan criticized the nebulous borders of the major-
ity's definition of "the people. ' 73 Justice Brennan pointed out that:
the Court admits that 'the people' extends beyond the precise borders
of the citizenry, but leaves the precise contours of its 'sufficient con-
nection' test unclear. At one point the majority hints that aliens are
protected by the fourth amendment only when they come within the
United States and develop 'substantial connections' with our country.
At other junctures, the Court suggests that an alien's presence in the
United States must be voluntary and that the alien must have 'accepted
some societal obligations.' 7
4
None of the cases cited by the majority75 required an alien's pres-
ence to be "voluntary" before the alien could claim the benefits of
the Constitution. 76
In establishing its "sufficient connection" test, Brennan ex-
plained that the majority ignored
the most obvious connection between Verdugo-Urquidez and the
United States: he was investigated and [was] being prosecuted for vio-
lations of United States law and may well spend the rest of his life in a
United States prison. The 'sufficient connection' [was] supplied not by
Verdugo-Urquidez, but by the Government .... He [became], quite
literally, one of the governed. 77
This should have entitled him to all the protections of the
Constitution.
Justice Brennan also explored the notion of mutuality, which he
felt the majority had disregarded. 78 He made a simple point of
fairness:
If we expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect
that we will obey our Constitution when we investigate, prosecute, and
punish them .... Mutuality is essential to ensure the fundamental
fairness that underlies our Bill of Rights. Foreign nationals investi-
gated and prosecuted for alleged violations of United States criminal
laws are just as vulnerable to oppressive government behavior as are
United States citizens investigated and prosecuted for the same al-
leged violations.
79
72 Id. at 1069-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 1070 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75 See id at 1063-64.
76 Id. at 1070 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 46-47.
77 Id. at 1070-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 1071 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brennan also noted that "[t]he Fourth Amendment contains
no express or implied territorial limitations." 80
Allowing the government to act with disregard for the law can
only breed contempt for the law, inviting anarchy and destroying
the values of law and order.81 "By placing respondent among those
governed by federal criminal laws and investigating him for viola-
tions of those laws, the Government has made him a part of our
community for purposes of the Fourth Amendment."8 2
Adding fuel to the fairness argument, Justice Brennan noted
that while "the majority suggests a restrictive interpretation of those
with 'sufficient connection' to this country to be considered among
'the people,' the term 'the people' is better understood as a rhetori-
cal counterpoint to 'the government,' such that rights that were re-
served to 'the people' were to protect all those subject to 'the
government.' "s83 This was the mindset of the Framers, who
designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit the government from infring-
ing on pre-existing rights and liberties.84
Justice Brennan added that "the majority mischaracterize[d]
Johnson v. Eisentrager as having 'rejected the claim that aliens are enti-
tled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of
the United States.' ",85 These.were not the grounds for the decision
in Eisentrager. Rather, as this Court wrote in Eisentrager, "disabilities
this country lays upon the alien who becomes also an enemy are
imposed temporarily as an incident of war and not as an incident of
alienage."'86 Thus, the Eisentrager Court "rejected the German na-
tionals' efforts to obtain writs of habeas corpus not because they
were foreign nationals, but because they were enemy soldiers.
'87
Furthermore, Justice Brennan noted that the Insular Cases also
do not stand for the propositions that the majority suggested.
8 8
"The Insular Cases all concerned whether accused persons enjoyed
the protections of certain rights in criminal prosecutions brought by
territorial authorities in territorial courts."8 9 The Insular Cases were
limited to their own particular facts long ago by the Court's holding
80 Id. at 1070 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 1071 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 1072 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 1073 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 1074 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950)).
86 Id (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 771).
87 IdL (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a listing of the Insular Cases, see supra note 37.
89 Id (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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in Reid v. Covert, where the Court proclaimed that "it is our judg-
ment that neither the [Insular Cases] nor their reasoning should be
given any further expansion." 90
Finally, Justice Brennan examined the reasons for enforcing the
Warrant Clause where a warrant would be of no legal effect.9 '
The Warrant Clause would serve the same primary functions abroad
as it does domestically, and I see no reason to distinguish between
foreign and domestic searches .... A warrant defines the scope of a
search and limits the discretion of the inspecting officers .... These
purposes would be served no less in the foreign than in the domestic
context. 9
2
That an American warrant would be of no legal force within Mexico
is of no consequence to the interpretation of the fourth amendment,
since "as a matter of United States constitutional law, a warrant
serves the same primary function overseas as it does domestically: it
assures that a neutral magistrate has authorized the search and lim-
ited its scope."'93 This is no less important abroad than within our
country's borders.
94
Justice Blackmun also authored a dissent in this case. 95 While
stipulating that the relationship between agents of the government
and foreign nationals is fundamentally different than that between
United States officials and individuals residing in this country, 96 Jus-
tice Blackmun agreed with Justice Brennan that "when a foreign na-
tional is held accountable for purported violations of United States
criminal laws, he has effectively been treated as one of 'the gov-
erned' and therefore is entitled to Fourth Amendment protec-
tions."'97 In this scheme, it is the enforcement of domestic criminal
law that implicates the fourth amendment and not the government's
exercise of power beyond our shores.
98
Because an American magistrate is powerless to authorize for-
eign searches, Justice Blackmun concluded that the Warrant Clause
was inapplicable to the search of a noncitizen's residence abroad.99
However, Justice Blackmun would have remanded the case for a de-
termination as to whether the search violated the reasonableness re-
90 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Reid v. Cover, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957)).
91 Id. at 1075-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 1076-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 1077 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 1078 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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quirement of the fourth amendment. 100
IV. ANALYSIS
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court wrongly decided that
the protections of the fourth amendment do not apply to the search
and seizure of property located in a foreign country and owned by a
nonresident alien legally present in the United States. In its deci-
sion, the majority misconstrued both the history and the purpose of
the fourth amendment, as well as its own prior decisions, and bla-
tantly disregarded fundamental notions of fairness.
A. HISTORICAL PURPOSE AND THE TEXT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Court relied on the text of the fourth amendment, histori-
cal evidence, and cases refusing to apply certain constitutional pro-
visions beyond the borders of the United States. As Justice Brennan
pointed out, however, "none of these . . . justifies the majority's
cramped interpretation of the fourth amendment's applicability."' 10 1,
The principles forwarded by the majority are unsupported by
the text and historical purpose of the fourth amendment. The
amendment was drafted "primarily to restrict the government's abil-
ity to obtain evidence from a criminal defendant for use in his
prosecution." 10
2
The purpose of the fourth amendment also supports its application, at
a minimum, to all people whom the United States has subjected to
criminal prosecution .... As early as 1886, [in Boyd v. United States 103]
the Court explained the intimate connection between the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures and a fair criminal trial.' 0
4
That the search here was conducted abroad is irrelevant for pur-
poses of constitutional interpretation. "The critical factor is not the
locus of the search, but the fact that United States officials con-
ducted it for the express purpose of obtaining evidence to use in Mr.
Verdugo-Urquidez's prosecution here."' 05 "Similarly, in applying
the exclusionary rule, the Court has stated that 'the need for deter-
rence and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are strong-
100 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 1072 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102 ACLU Brief, supra note 48, at 5.
103 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
104 ACLU Brief, supra note 48, at 13.
105 Id. at 5. In 1886, the Court declared that the fourth and fifth amendments "apply
to all invasions. on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life . . . any forcible and compulsory extortion of a
man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of a
crime." Id. at 13 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
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est where the government's unlawful conduct would result in
imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim of the search.' "106
The text of the fourth amendment demonstrates that it is of no
consequence that the search of the residences of a registered alien
lawfully within the United States took place outside the boundaries
of the United States. The plurality in Reid expressly repudiated such
a "territoriality" notion,1 07 and "since Reid, no court has suggested
that any constitutional provision is inapplicable because the chal-
lenged conduct occurred in a foreign country."' 0 8 Furthermore, no
territorial limitations can be found in the language of the fourth
amendment. In fact, the Court has held that the fourth amendment
refers to and protects "people" rather than "areas." 1 09 By contrast,
other Constitutional provisions specifically limit their geographical
protections.110 For example, Article I, Section Eight of the Consti-
tution requires that all duties, imposts and excises "be uniform
throughout the United States."' 11 The Constitution also grants
Congress the power to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas." 11
2
Not only is the fourth amendment without geographical limita-
tions, it also lacks the emphasis on citizenship that the majority
wishes to give it. The majority's emphasis on the fourth amendment
phrase "the people" is equally misplaced, improperly relying on the
framers efforts to avoid a literal redundancy. As Justice Brennan
noted, "the majority's suggestion that the drafters could have used
'person' ignores the fact that the fourth amendment then would
have begun quite awkwardly: 'the right of persons to be secure in
their persons.' " 113 The framers simply avoided an awkward rhetor-
106 ACLU Brief, supra note 48, at 14 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
347-48 (1974)).
107 "The approach that the Constitution has no applicability abroad has long since
been directly repudiated by numerous cases." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 56 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). The notion that the Constitution is inoperative outside the
United States "has long since evaporated. Governmental action abroad is performed
under both the authority and the restrictions of the Constitution." Id. at 67 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The plurality's approach was adopted three years later in Kinsella v.
United States ev rel Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
108 Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at
Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 23 (1985).
109 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). Note that the term "people" here
is not limited to citizens.
110 ACLU Brief, supra note 48, at 10. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, sec. 8, cls. 3, 4, 10 &
17; U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec. 2, cl. 2.
111 U.S. CONsT. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1.
112 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.
113 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1072 n.9 (1990) (Brennan,J.,
dissenting).
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ical redundancy in their use of the phrase "the people." 114 The
term is thus "better understood as a rhetorical counterpoint to 'the
government,' such that rights that were reserved to 'the people'
were to protect all those subject to 'the government.' "115
In concentrating on the phrase "the people," the majority im-
plicitly gave credence to the "social compact" perspective of consti-
tutional interpretation, which "envisages the Constitution as a social
compact that binds by mutual obligations both the government and
'We the People' of the United States."'116 This perspective is inap-
posite with a long history of constitutional interpretation. Citizen-
ship itself cannot serve as the touchstone for the applicability of
constitutional rights, because the Supreme Court has long recog-
nized that aliens within the United States, even illegally, enjoy a
broad panoply of such rights.' 1 7 "This panoply includes the fourth
amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures." 118
Only once has the Court applied the social compact doctrine, in
Dred Scott v. Sanford.119 The Court should be careful not to repeat
this ignominious bit of history. Therefore, "the people" must be
synonymous to "the governed."' 120
Verdugo-Urquidez became one of the governed when the
United States first investigated and then arrested him for violation
of its laws. These two events created the "substantial connection"
114 ACLU Brief, supra note 48, at 12 n.4.
115 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1072 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116 Note, Extraterritorial Applicability, supra note 33, at 1674. See also supra note 33 (dis-
cussing social compact theory).
117 Note, ExtraterritoyialApplicability, supra note 33, at 1675-76. Indeed, most legal clas-
sifications based on alienage are subject to the most severe form ofjudicial review, the
"strict scrutiny" test. Id. at 1676 n.17. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982)
(holding that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment bars states from
denying public education to illegal aliens); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372
(1971); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) ("[A]ll persons within
the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by [the fifth
and sixth] amendments."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("The four-
teenth amendment.., is not confined to the protection of citizens .... [Its] provisions
are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction [of the
United States].").
118 Note, Extraterritorial Applicability, supra note 33, at 1675-76. The Supreme Court
has made clear that the fourteenth amendment protects aliens within the United States.
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Lopez-Mendoza implicitly recognized that
illegal aliens within the United States have fourth amendment rights. Furthermore,
"even nonresident aliens have been granted constitutional rights against takings of prop-
erty within the United States without just compensation." Note, ExtraterritorialApplicabil-
ity, supra note 33, at 1676 n.17 (citing e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228
(1942); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481,489 (1931)) (emphasis in
original).
119 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
120 This position is consistent with .the "organic perspective" discussed supra note 33.
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for which the majority searched in vain. The majority simply ig-
nored the most obvious connection between Verdugo-Urquidez and
the United States: he was investigated and arrested by officials of
this country and may be subject to lengthy incarceration in an Amer-
ican prison. Consequently, as Justice Brennan properly pointed
out, the "substantial connection" is ironically supplied not by
Verdugo-Urquidez, but by the government. 121
Invocation of the exclusionary rule presupposes that an alien is in
United States custody and is being prosecuted in a United States
courtroom for a violation of United States law. As the 'government
seeks to exploit the fruits of its unlawful conduct in a criminal pro-
ceeding against the alien in the United States,' it strengthens the nexus
created at the time of the search. 1
22
It should be noted here that the "substantial connection" test ap-
pears nowhere in the history of the fourth amendment, and there is
nothing else to suggest that the framers thought it should be a fac-
tor. Indeed, it comes perilously close to the "social compact" per-
spective that the Court has long since rejected. Thus, the Court
erred in two respects: first, in applying a "substantial connection"
test which is not within the realm of the fourth amendment; and
second, in holding that Verdugo-Urquidez failed to meet the test.
The majority also erred in its construction of the Court's prior
decisions. Had the Court properly construed its own holdings, it
could not have reached the result that the majority reached here. As
Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, the majority miscon-
strued and mischaracterized the cases it chiefly relied upon. Neither
Eisentrager nor the Insular Cases stands for the propositions that the
majority suggests. Indeed, the Insular Cases did not even concern
constitutional rights vis-a-vis United States agents, but vis-a-vis the
local territorial authorities. 123 In Balzac v. Porto Rico 124 [sic], for ex-
ample, "the claim was not that the Constitution restricts United
States officials, but that because of United States sovereignty over
Puerto Rico, the local courts and local officials were required to af-
ford the defendant a jury trial."125 Thus, "the Insular Cases do not
apply when the United States is acting as prosecutor in its own
121 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1070 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
122 Note, Extraterritorial Applicability, supra note 33, at 1681 (quoting United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974)). See also United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d
1252, 1262 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Once we subject foreign vessels or aliens to criminal prose-
cution, they are entitled to the equal protection of all our laws, including the Fourth
Amendment.").
123 ACLU Brief, supra note 48, at 31.
124 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
125 Id. at 31-32.
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court."1 26 Moreover, the Insular Cases involved construction of Con-
gress' power to regulate all territory belonging to the United
States, 127 a power that historically has been viewed as plenary.
128
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Tos-
canino 129 developed a better approach to the issues presented by
this case. In Toscanino, the Second Circuit applied fourth amend-
ment protections to foreign wiretapping in the context of a federal
criminal prosecution of a foreign national. The Second Circuit con-
cluded that "it is beyond dispute that an alien may invoke the fourth
amendment's protection against an unreasonable search and seizure
conducted in the United States."'8 0 The Second Circuit next made
dear that there is no sound basis on which to support a different
rule "with respect to aliens who are the victims of unconstitutional
action abroad, at least where the government seeks to exploit the
fruits of its unlawful conduct in a criminal proceeding against the
alien in the United States."' 3 ' This notion is buttressed by the hold-
ing of the Supreme Court in Balzac, in which the Court declared
that, "the Constitution of the United States is in force... whenever
and wherever the sovereign power of that government is ex-
erted," 2 and is recognized by the "organic" or "natural rights"
perspective.
33
This philosophy, consistent with the Court's holdings regarding
constitutional rights of aliens, would have better served the court in
properly adjudicating Verdugo-Urquidez's claim, since it views the
extraterritorial reach of the Bill of Rights as coextensive with the
protections they guarantee within U.S. territory without regard to
citizenship. 13 4 In focusing on the alleged infringer of a right, rather
than the identity of the alleged rightholder, the organic perspective
protects all individuals affected by the conduct of United States offi-
cials. This is consistent both with the history and purpose of the
fourth amendment outlined above and with the Court's own
126 United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 249 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979) (quoted in
ACLU Brief, supra note 48, at 32).
127 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, sec. 3.
128 ACLU Brief, supra note 48, at 32. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148
(1904); see also Note, Inventive Statesmanship vs. the Territorial Clause: The Constitutionality of
Agreements Limiting Territorial Powers, 60 VA. L. REv. 1041, 1046-47, 1052 (1974).
129 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
130 Id. at 280 (citing Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
864 (1971)).
131 Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 280.
132 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922).
133 For discussion of the "organic" perspective, see supra note 33.
134 Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the United States, 20
VA.J. INT'L. L. 741, 747 n.30 (1980).
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precedents. 3 5
The Court's holding in Balzac is more consistent with constitu-
tional principles than the holding in the present case. Aliens in this
country have been consistently protected by those provisions of the
Constitution not expressly limited to American citizens.' 3 6 Con-
versely, the Constitution expressly limits the actions of United
States officials abroad. "In applying the Constitution abroad... it is
always a United States citizen-a government official-who is being
controlled by the Constitution."'
13 7
B. MUTUALITY
In its decision, the Court creates an impermissible paradox:
while foreign nationals must abide by our laws, even when in their
own countries, our government need not abide by our laws-in par-
ticular the fourth amendment-when conducting investigations of
these same foreign nationals. As Justice Brennan pointed out, such
a decision ignores all notions of mutuality and simple fairness. "If
we expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect
that we will obey our Constitution when we investigate, prosecute,
and punish them."'
38
This fundamental principle has been recognized since the time
of the framers and is essential to the fundamental fairness that un-
derlies the Bill of Rights. 139 James Madison, speaking on the rights
of aliens under the Constitution, noted that "it will not be disputed
that, as [aliens] owe, on one hand a temporary obedience [to the
Constitution], they are entitled, in return, to [constitutional] protec-
tion[s] and advantage[s]."140 The underlying rationale for this posi-
tion is clear when we recognize that "foreign nationals investigated
135 See Comment, The Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution-Unalienable Rights?,
72 VA. L. REv. 649, 676 (1986).
The extraterritorial application of the Constitution has evolved from the myopic
territorial approach of the late nineteenth century... . Courts should abandon the
distinction between citizens and aliens in favor of a constitutional doctrine protect-
ing all individuals affected by the conduct of United States officials, for the sake of
protecting both the natural rights of men and the integrity of the Constitution.
Id.
136 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1982); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,
344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
137 Ragosta, Aliens Abroad- Principles for the Application of Constitutional Limitations to Fed-
eral Action, 17 N.Y.UJ. INT'L. L. & P. 287, 293-94 (1985) (quoted in ACLU Brief, supra
note 48, at 25).
138 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1071 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
139 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140 James Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (quoted in erdugo-Urquidez,
110 S. Ct. at 1071 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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and prosecuted for alleged violations of United States criminal laws
are just as vulnerable to oppressive government behavior as are
United States citizens investigated and prosecuted for the same al-
leged violations." 14 1 'Aliens otherwise vulnerable to a government
acting beyond the bounds of the Constitution are dependent upon
considerations of mutuality for their protection.
Mutuality also serves the connected purpose of inculcating the
values of law and order. As Justice Brennan aptly points out, "by
respecting the rights of foreign nationals, we encourage other na-
tions to respect the rights of our citizens. Conversely, as Justice
Brandeis warned in Olmstead v. United States,142 "if the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law."' 43
C. POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS
The Court may well be caught up in the "war on drugs." This
country certainly is caught up in the "war" attempting to eradicate
one of our country's gravest social ills. Verdugo-Urquidez has been
convicted in a separate proceeding for his involvement in the highly
publicized torture and murder of American Drug Enforcement
Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar.' 44  Since the murder, the Justice
Department's Drug Enforcement Administration has been "relent-
less in its efforts to track down and bring to justice everyone in-
volved in his death."' 45 Indeed, the Justice Department's efforts are
widely rumored to include kidnapping and the use of bounty
hunters.146 Among the more peaceful measures taken to track
down the killers was Operation Intercept, in which the United States
searched every car coming out of Mexico for clues to the murder.'
47
The Court may have felt moved to punish all those responsible
for a grizzly and public assassination. Several other aliens, includ-
ing the a brother-in-law of a former Mexican president, have been
convicted in United States courts for events connected with the
141 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1071 (BrennanJ., dissenting). This, of course, also
relates to the historical purpose of the fourth amendment, discussed throughout this
section.
142 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
143 Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoted in Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1071
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
144 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7. The death of DEA agent Enrique
Camarena Salazar sparked a great deal of fury and received much attention both in the
press and in policy-making circles.
145 L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1990, at B6, col. 1.
146 Id.
147 U.P.I., Mar. 30, 1985, International Section.
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murder. 148 The murder was committed following days of torture at
the hands of foreign drug smugglers, and included injections to
keep Camarena Salazar's heart from failing during the brutal
interrogation.
14 9
While the briefs obliquely refer to the death of a DEA agent,
the Court referred sharply to a "kidnapping and torture-mur-
der." 15 0 It is at least curious that the Court should stress facts that
would otherwise seem less than intimately connected to the consti-
tutional issue at hand.'
5 '
V. CONCLUSION
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the United States Supreme Court improp-
erly ruled that the fourth amendment does not protect individuals
against the search and seizure of property that is both owned by a
nonresident alien and located in a foreign country. The Court
reached this decision even though the material seized was specifi-
cally intended for use at trial against the alien within the United
States.
In its holding, the Court diverged from precedent establishing
the broad rights of aliens under the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
amendment. The Verdugo-Urquidez majority reduced the investiga-
tion of the rights of aliens to a substantial connection test that can
be found nowhere in the Constitution. In doing so, the Court im-
plicitly adopted notions of territoriality and social compact long
since rejected, and ignored its prior holdings recognizing the natu-
ral rights of aliens. Furthermore, the Court cast a blind eye to fair-
ness and the philosophy of mutuality implicit in the Bill of Rights in
general and the fourth amendment in particular.
Allowing nonresident aliens the protection of the fourth
amendment when their homes abroad are violated by United States
agents fulfills the purpose of the fourth amendment. That purpose
is to limit the government of the United States from improperly
abridging the rights of any person. Its protections do not run to
citizens alone. Ruling in Verdugo-Urquidez's favor would have lim-
148 L.A. Times, Sept. 27, 1988, at A3, col. 5. Some sixty people were tried in Mexico
in connection with the murder.
149 L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1990, at B6, col. 1. Camarena Salazar's broken body was
found dumped on a roadside wrapped in plastic. The body appeared to have been bur-
ied previously at another location and exhumed. Wash. Post, Mar. 7, 1985, at A16, col.
1.
150 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1990).
151 For one scholar's view on reading between the lines ofjudicial opinions for impor-
tant stories, see Papke, Discharge as Denouement- Appreciating the Storytelling of Appellate Opin-
ions, 40J. LEGAL EDUC. 145 (1990).
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ited the government's behavior only when it acts without regard to
constitutional restraints and would not have unnecessarily impinged
on the powers of the political branches. Instead, the Supreme
Court's refusal to recognize the fourth amendment rights of nonres-
ident aliens damages the purpose of the Bill of Rights and lays waste
to considerations of mutuality and fairness.
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